Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1976

Ronald P. Stubbs v. Lyman W. Hemmer : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
McCune & McCune; Attorneys for AppellantDale M, Dorius; ATTORNEY RESPONDENT
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stubbs v. Hemmert, No. 14801 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/481

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

------------RONALD P. STUBBS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
)

vs.
LYMAN

w.

)
)
)
)

HEMMERT,

Case No.
14801

)

Defendant and Respondent.

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from Judgment of Fourth Judicial District
Court, Utah county, State.of Utah, Honorable
J. Robert Bullock, District·Judge

McCune & McCune
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellant
Dale M, Dorius
29 South Main
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Respondent

F ~ l ED
DEC 101976
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

...
.....

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE •
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT

0

Page
1

•

•

0

•

•

0

0

0

•

1

•

•

•

0

•

•

1

•eeto•e•o•••oo

eo•o•••o•••••••••

1

5

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING THE EARNEST
MONEY RECEIPT AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT
INTO EVIDENCE WHEN SAME HAD BEEN
EXTINGUISHED AND MERGED BY EXECUTION
AND DELIVERY OF THE WARRANTY DEED TO
BUYERS DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1971 • o o

5

POINT II. THE COURT COMMITTED SUBTANTIAL
ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT AN OFFSET
OF $200.00 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST
FROM DATE OF REMOVAL AS REDUCTION IN
VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY NOT BASED UPON
COMPETENT PROOF OF WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY TO ESTABLISH SAID REDUCTION IN
MARKET VALUE
• • • o • • • • • • • o •

•

9

POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBTANTIAL ERRORY
BY AWARDING DEFENDANT $200.00 DAMAGE
FOR THE VALUE OF COMPRESSORS REMOVED
FROM THE BUILDING CONTRARY TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY WHEN SAID COMPRESSORS HAD BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE
THIRD PARTY WHO REMOVED THEM, TENDERED
TO DEFENDANT, REJECTED BY DEFENDANT,
AND RETURNED TO THE BUILDING FROM
WHICH REMOVED • • o • o • o o o • o o o

•

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

Page
POINT IV. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL
ERROR BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF ONLY
$150.00 FOR THE SERVICES OF HIS
ATTORNEY o • o
,
•
•
•
•

0

•

..

CONCLUSION

16
30

APPENDIX 1

Mortgage Note , • ,

APPENDIX 2

Mortgage, P• 2

APPENDIX 3

Central Utah Fee Sc;hedule

APPENDIX 4

llt;ih State Bar Fee Sc;hedule

APPENDIX 5

Utah Bar Letter, May 1974, P• 4 • •

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

o

31

•

•

32

0

•

•

•

o

•

•

•

0

33

o

o

•

o

•

34
35

••o•••o•••oo

Cases Cited
Amos Flight Operations, Inc. v. Thunderbird
Bank, 540 P2d 1244 (Ariz. 1975) • o , •

29

Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 U2d 370, 335 P2d
404 (Utah 1959)
o o • •
•
•
• •

•

o

•

o

9-10

Attebery v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.,
191 Kan 178, 388 P2d 647 (Kan. 1963)

•

0

•

0

20, 21

Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. Board of Education of Jordan School District of Salt
Lake County, 61 U 149, 211 P 981 (Utah 1922)

11

Bunnell v. Bills, 13 U2d 83, 368 P2d 597
(Utah 1962) • • • • o o • o •
o o

10

o

o

•

Crosby v. Anderson, 49 U 167, 162 P75 (Utah 1916)

11

Dern Investment Co. v. Carbon County Land Co.,
74 U 76, 76 P2d 616 (Utah 1938) • • • • • •

11

Flagala Corp. v. Hamm, 302 So2d 195 (Fla. 1974)

28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

Page

Higley v. Industrial Commission, 75 u 361,
285 p 306 • • • • • • •
•

•

Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U 320, 145
P 1036 (Utah 1915) • o • •

0

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

i;arren v. Bair, 63 U 344, 225 P 1094

•

•

0

Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 U2d 226, 419 P2d
199 (Utah 1966)
, o • , o 0 • • ,

0

•

•

11

•

•

21-22
11

0

0

6

McDaniel v. Quinn, 307 P2d 127 (Okla. 1957)

0

•

7

Morrison v. Federico, 232 P2d 374, 379
(Utah 1951)
• • • , o • • • • , • o

0

0

26-27

•

0

8

0

•

Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 NM 236,
114 P2d 740 (N.M. 1941) • • • • • •
Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P2d 725 (Utah 1953) •
Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 U 142, 158
P 684 (Utah 1916)
• • • • • • • , •
Rich v. Stephens, 79 U 411, 11 P2d 295
(Utah 1932)
• • • • • • • • • • • •

11

. ...

5

•

14

San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Inc. v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 104 Cal. Rptr.
733, 28 Cal App. 3rd 556 (Cal. 1972) • • • •

29

Security Title Co. v. Pay Less Builders
Supply, 17 U2d 179, 407 P2d 141 (Utah 1965)

21

Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 U 318, 140
P2d 314
. • • • o • • • • ,
•
•
o
•

11

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U2d
306, 352 P2d 693 (Utah 1960)

9

0

•

•

• • • •

State v. Shonka, 3 U2d 121, 279 P2d 709
(Utah 1955)
• • • • • o • o
o •

•

•

28

Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207 P2d
178 (Utah 1949)
• • • • • •

18-20, 23

Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U2d 61, 362
P2d 427 (Utah 1961)
• • • • • • • •

14

Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 U2d 401, 402,
21
P2d
699 (Utah 1965)
• • • • • • • • •
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iii-

Other Authorities Cited

38 ALR 2d 1311, Secs 2 and 16
57 ALR 3d 475

.....
..

.

0

0

5, 6

0

.... .....

57 ALR 3rd 475, 2(a)
58 ALR 3rd 201

.

Page

0

0

0

22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 326
7 CJS Attorney and Client, Sec. 191(2)
30 CJS Equity, Sec. 89

• •

o

o

16, 20
21

0

•

21

•

•

c

10-11, 1
21

...

14

30 CJS Equity, Sec. 89, PP• 1059-1060 •

14

31A CJS Evidence, Sec. 181, note 72 •

9

32 CJS Evidence, Sec. 182(3)

..

11

32A CJS Evidence, Sec. 1042 • • • • • • • • • •

11

Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association, DR2-106(B) • •

17

Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Utah State Bar, DR2-106(B) • • • • • o • •

o

17

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-37-9 • • •

16

Statutes Cited

Legend
D = defendant exhibit
p = plaintiff exhibit
T = transcript
R = record
A
appendix

-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iv-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------000-------RONALD p, STUBB.5,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

vs.
LYMAN W. HEMMERT,
Defendant - Respondent,

Brief
of
Appellant

No. 14801

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by appellant on a note foreclosing
a mortgage securing same and counterclaim by respondent
for breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff was granted judgment and foreclosure in the
amount of $810.00 on unpaid note and $150.00 attorney fee
minus setoff of $62.04 for utility bill and $200.00 damage
for breach of contract to supply cooling equipment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks striking of $200.00 damage and interest
awarded defendant and increase of attorney fees awarded in
lower court and additional attorney fees for appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 1971, plaintiff and defendant entered
into an agreement whereby plaintiff would buy defendant's
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home in Provo, Utah and transfer to defendant all of plaintiff's interest in a store in Santaquin, Utah which plaintiff
had run as a grocery store until December 31, 1970 (T27),
Plaintiff was allowed a sales price of $13,000,00 for said
store (T7112), $8,700.00 of which was applied as a down payment on the purchase of defendant's home and the balance of
$4,300.00 was reduced to a note (Exhibit "A" of Complaint,
RlOO; pre-trial order, R44).
The original earnest money receipt and exchange agreement provided that two walk-in coolers and their cooling
equipment were to be part of the exchange and sale (Dl).
Plaintiff executed a Warranty Deed in favor of defendant
to the store on February 18, 1971, and defendant and his now
deceased wife gave plaintiff a mortgage on said store dated
February 20, 1971, to secure plaintiff's $4,300.00 note from
defendant (Exhibits "A" and "B" of Complaint, RlOO).

Both

the Warranty Deed and mortgage were recorded in the office of
the Utah County Recorder on February 23, 1971.
At the time the store exchange was made, the parties
agreed that plaintiff could leave the display cases and
other personal property of the grocery store business in the
store building and the parties would attempt to sell the personal property and realty together (T812-9; 1515-15; 3311-5).
When this proved fruitless, plaintiff sold $3,200.00 of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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personal property inventory to Burt Durrant (T32J 37a22-30; 38) 0
Mr. Durrant removed two compressors from the walk-in
coolers when he was removing the rest of the equipment
purchased by him (T34114-30).
Defendant was very anxious to sell the store (Tl5a5-10)
but no offers were received from anyone desiring to buy the
building to operate as a grocery store or otherwise use the
walk-in coolers (Tl6124-30).

Then defendant sold the build-

ing to Milo .Jmssen for $7,500.00 on August l, 1973 (T9a30•
23-25; D4).
About July 30, 1974 plaintiff began contacting defendant
about delinquent payments on the mortgage and note (T36al-2),
after which defendant sent plaintiff a memo dated August 19,
1974, complaining about the two compressors (D2).

Plaintiff

responded and requested payments on the delinquent note (D2).
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff enlisted the services of
his counsel to collect the note and foreclose the mortgage
(T36113-15).
Numerous contacts were made to get the note paid including efforts on the part of plaintiff to contact Durrant,
obtain the return of the compressors by Durrant to Stubbs,
and attempt to return said compressors to the store in
Santaquin but defendant rejected said compressors and was
uncooperative (Tl0al7; 29; 36; 28; 39J 21•51-55).

Plaintiff's
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attorneys have since performed considerable services for
plaintiff in foreclosing plaintiff•s mortgage (T52-58; Rl-106),
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT INTO
EVIDENCE WHEN SAME HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED AND MERGED BY
EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THE WARRANTY DEED TO BUYERS
DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1971.
The general doctrine of merger is recognized by our
court as follows1
It has become elementary that, in the absence
of fraud, all the conditions and provisions
contained in an antecedent executory contract
or agreement are merged in the deed which is
executed and delivered in fulfillment of the
stipulations contained in said agreement. In
the case of Siocum v. Bracy, 55 Minn. 22, 56
N. w. 826, 43 Am. St. Rep. 499, Mr. Justice
Mitchell states the rule clearly thus1
'No rule of law is better settled than that,
where a deed has been executed and accepted
as performance of an executory contract to
convey real estate, the contract is functus
officio, and the rights of the parties rest
thereafter solely on the deed. This is so
although the deed thus accepted varies from
that stipulated for in the contract, as where
the vendee accepts the deed of a third party
in lieu of the deed of his vendor; and as, in
the sales of land, the law remits the party
to his covenants in his deed, if there by no
ingredient of fraud or mistake in the case,
and the party has not taken the precaution to
secure himself by covenants, he has no remedy
for his money, even on failure of title.•
Reese Howell Coo vs. Brown, 48 U 142, 158 P
684 (Utah 1916)
In the absence of fraud or mistake, merger is only
avoided where it is clearly shown the parties intended to
avoid merger or where the provisions were clearly collateral.
38 ALR2d 1311, Secs. 2 and 16.

And a collateral agreement
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is often designed to take effect after the execution of the
deed such as a covenant to make improvements or repairs.

38

ALR2d 1311 1 Sec. 2.
Our court of 1966 held an earnest money receipt merged
in a deed of conveyance which was poorly drawn providing for
ultimate conveyance to be made in the name of "to be arranged"
and also providing that same would be abrogated by execution
of the final deed.
(Utah 1966).

Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 U2d 226,419 P2d 199

In the Kelsey case the earnest money receipt

had obligated the buyers to furnish certain draperies.

Our

court indicated further in Kelsey that such a situation was
not convincing to them as being a collateral agreement and
that only equity, fraud, mistake, and the like could have
made them rule otherwise but no such equities were pleaded.
Our case is essentially the same type of situation.

An

earnest money agreement was entered into by the parties (Dl)
on February 3, 1971 providing for transfer of the grocery
store in Santaquin to defendant for a credit of $8,700.00
on plaintiff's purchase of defendant's home in Provo.

Consum-

mating the exchange, a Warranty Deed dated February 18, 1971
(P7) conveying the grocery store to defendant and defendant's
wife was delivered and recorded in the office of the Utah
County Recorder on February 23, 1971.

Said facts were admit-

ted in the court's pre-trial order (R44) and in testimony by
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defendant (T31).

An examination of the earnest money receipt

shows no intent on the parties that the plaintiff would be
obligated to make sure the walk-in coolers were attached
to the building for an indefinite period of time nor can the
statement on lines 69 through 72 of said agreement stating
"the two walk-in coolers with their cooling equipment are to
be left in tact with the building" be considered a collateral
covenant.
The statement that the walk-in coolers were to remain
with the building is dependent upon the obligation to convey.
On February 18, 1971, the property was conveyed.

From that

point in time plaintiff had fulfilled his obligations under
the earnest money agreement.
From that point on any obligation remaining to defendant by plaintiff to protect the coolers and equipment was
in the form of a duty recognizable in tort and recovery on
the principles of negligence

or unlawful conversion against

plaintiff would be necessary.
Moreover defendant had a duty to make sure he was getting what he contracted for.
also applies.

The principle of caveat emptor

It has been stated•

The doctrine of caveat emptor applies in instances
where there is inspection or investigation of
premises by purchaser prior to execution of contract for purchase. McDaniel v. Quinn, 307 P2d
127 (Okla. 1957),

-7-
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And the doctrine also applies to the purchase of real
property except as otherwise provided by statuteo

Mosley v.

Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 NM 236, 114 P2d 740 (N.M. 1941).
It is incumbent upon the purchaser to examine the property
prior to taking possession.

Mro Hemmert indicated he had

inspected the premises after signing the earnest money agreement (TlS).
There was no intent shown that the parties intended a
provision regarding walk-in coolers and their equipment not
to merge nor is there any collateral covenant which would
abrogate the doctrine of merger in this case.

The earnest

money agreement was improperly admitted into evidence over
plaintiff's objection (T4118-27),

(The record should read

"extinguished" in place of "distinguished" and "recording"
instead of "reporting" on lines 19 and 20 of T4.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT
AN OFFSET OF $200.00 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FROM DATE OF
REMOVAL AS REDUCTION IN VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY NOT BASED
UPON
COMPETENT PROOF OF WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY TO
ESTABLISH SAID REDUCTION IN MARKET VALUE.
The trial court's pre-trial order (R44) set forth the
issue of defendant's damage on his counterclaim, if any,
to be1
Whether or not the value of the mortgaged property set forth above was reduced by removal of
two air compressors from the building on said
premises, whether said removal was wrongfully
done by plaintiff, and if so, the amount in
which the market value of said property was
reduced by said wrongful removal.
Arrldefendant's counsel indicated this was his understanding
of the issue before the court (T64al2; T80a2).
The issue before the court was whether the market value
of the real property mortgaged had been reduced by the improper
removal of two compressors by plaintiff.

Our court has defined

"market value" to meana
'Market value' is the price which property will
bring when offered for sale by one desiring, but
not compelled, to sell, and bought by one desiring, but not compelled, to purchase. Southern
Pacific co. vs. Arthur, 10 U2d 306, 352 P2d 693 (Utah 1960)
31A CJS Evidence, Sec. 181, note 72.
In an action for a breach of contract

~n

sale of realty,

our court has set down the following rules
The proper measure of damages would be the difference between the defendant's offer and the

-9-
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actual market value of the property 9 but the market
value should be properly established. • • • Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 U2d 370, 335 P2d 404 (Utah 1959) 0
The above rule was restated by our jurisidiction in 1972
as follows1
The measure of damages where the vendor has breached
a land sale contract is the market value of the
property at the time of the breach less the contract
price to the vendee. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 U2d 83,
368 P2d 597 (Utah 1962 •
The court in Bunnell further stated1
Where a rule of law has been established for the
measurement of damages, it must be followed by
the finder of fact, and to recover damages plaintiff must prove not only that she has suffered a
loss, but must also prove the extent and amount
thereof.
Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based
on the value of the property there must be proof
of its value or evidence of such facts as will
warrant a finding of value with reasonable certainty. Bunnell v. Bills, supra.
Arn Jur on damages states with regards to property attached
to or forming a part of realtya
The measure of damages for injuries for destruction of property attached to, or forming a part
of, real· estate, and the admissibility of evidence
to establish such damages, depends to some extent
upon the character of the property taken or destroyed.
If the property destroyed or injured is
so closely connected with the land as to have little
value separate from, and independent of the land,
the measure of damages is the difference in value
between the real estate before the injury and after
it; the evidence to prove the amount of damages
should relate to such difference in value rather
than to the value of the property destroyed or
injured. For example, testimony as to the value
of shade trees is not admissible upon the question
of damages for their destruction, since such damages
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are measured in the depreciation of the value of
the land. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Sec. 326.
Where there is direct and positive evidence of the
present value of property, the mere cost thereof at some
prior time is not controlling if of any weight whatever
to sh01its present value.
162 P75 (Utah 1916).

Crosby v. Anderson, 49 U 167,

And generally even offers to buy or

sell real estate are not admissible to prove the value of
property.

32 CJS Evidence, Sec. 182(3).

Our jurisdiction's

cases are numerous in stating that substantial evidence is
required to support a finding (Bingham Coal and Lumber Coo
vs. Board of Education of Jordan School District of Salt
Lake County, 61 U 149, 211 P 981, Utah 1922) and that a
finding of fact cannot be based on surmise, conjecture, guess,
or speculation.

Just a few additional citations area

Investment Co. vs. Carbon County Land Co.,

7~U

~

76, 76 P2d

616 (Utah 1938)J Higley vs. Industrial Commission, 75 U 361,
285 p 306; Karren vs. Bair, 63 U 344, 225 P 1094; and
vs. warwood, 255 P2d 725 (Utah 1953).
based on mere possibilities.
104 u 318, 140 P2d 314.

~

Nor can a finding be

Smith vs. Industrial Commission,

See also 32A CJS Evidence, Sec. 1042.

The defendant has not sustained his burden of proof in
this action sufficient to warrant the award of any damages
for loss in market value due to removal of two compressors

-11-
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from the store acquired from plaintiff,

The trial court

itself was concerned about any measure of damage (T67al7-22;
T7l127),
Any evidence bearing upon damage was certainly specUlati ve.

No clear or precise evidence was presented to show

the market value had been reduced because two compressors
were not present in the building.

All that was shown was

that $13,000.00 was allowed by Mr. Hemmert as a credit to' Mr.
Stubbs for the grocery store building with fixtures attached
(T7112).

No personal property, the display cases and other

items of movable grocery store
the exchange,

equipmen~

were considered in

Then Mr. Hemmert sold the property to Mr.

Jensen for $7,500.00 (T9130; 23125).

Hemmert then states

that he feels he could have sold the store together with
personal equipment as a grocery store (Tll119).

However, no

offers to purchase the building for a grocery store or for a
use to otherwise utilize the walk-in coolers was received
(Tl6124-28).

Jensen purchased the building at the price

offered by the realtor (T2515-8); and Jensen would not have
paid one cent more for the property if the compressors had
been in the building (T25120-23).
The testimony of the refrigeration man, Larry Hopkin
(T43-44) was offered by plaintiff to impeach the allegations

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Hemmert who claimed damages in his complaint in the
amount of over $5,000.00, and was not offered nor can it be
accepted to prove the reduction in value of the realty,
Am.Jur.2d Damages, Sec. 326, Supra.
that he examined two compressors.

22

Mr. Hopkins testified
But the evidence dces not

even establish the fact that these two compressors were in
fact the two compressors present in the building when it was
sold to Hemmert.
The only other evidence which in any way could bear
upon damage was the testimony of real estate agent Eugene
Black Nhich is not before the court in the transcript and
which defendant did not designate as further record on appeal.
But the trial court's understanding of his testimony as being
merely conjectural and speculative is clear in the transcript
(T79119-21).

No competent evidence of sufficient weight was produced
at trial to in any way prove damage to market value and the
finding of the trial court regarding $200.00 damage should be
set aside.

-13-
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POINT III
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBTANTIAL
ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT $200.00 DAMAGE FOR THE VALUE
OF COMPRESSORS REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING CONTRARY TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY WHEN SAID COMPRESSORS HAD BEEN RECOVERED FROM THE THIRD PARTY WHO REMOVED THEM, TENDERED
TO DEFENDANT, REJECTED BY DEFENDANT, AND RETURNED TO THE
BUILDING FROM WHICH REMOVED.
A fundamental maxim of equity is that equity seeks to
do justice and avoid injustice.

30 CJS ECJ?ity, Sec. 891

Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U2d 61, 362 P2d 427 (Utah 1961),
Coinciding with this maxim is the principle that equality
is equity.

Rich v. Stephens, 79 U 411, 11 P2d 295 (Utah 1932),

No greater injustice and inequity can result than to
require plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of $200.00 for
two compressors when plaintiff through his own efforts
obtained return of two compressors to the grocery store in
Santaquin.

Equity will not suffer a double satisfaction to

be taken nor unjust enrichment.

30 CJS Equity, Sec. 89,

pg· 1059-1060.
Once Mr. Henunert's complaint was known, plaintiff took
it upon himself to obtain the compressors from Mr. Durrant,
the person who had taken them from the grocery store (T341
10129; 29119),

Then plaintiff attempted to return said

coolers to defendant (Tl719-24; 36119-25; 38115-20).

But

defendant rejected said compressors and claimed he had no
use for them (T3918-20; 21122-27).

-14-
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The testimony is not clear as to what plaintiff did
with the compressors after Mr. Hemmert rejected them, but
it may be inferred from the testimony of Mr. Hopkin (T42-44)
indicating that he examined two compressors at the grocery
store in Santaquin on July 27, 1976.

And the purchaser of

the store from defendant, Mr • .lmssen

was to receive the two

walk-in coolers with the purchase (T23a26-30, 2411-3).

Plain-

tiff housed the compressors for several months in his own
garage and then delivered them to the Santaquin store where
Mr. Hopkin examined them.
Equity cannot allow defendant to be paid for compressors
returned to the store where they were to be.

To rule other-

wise would be unjust enrichment and double recovery.

Equity

should step in and equalize the status of the parties.

-15-
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POINT IV
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL
ERROR BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF ONLY $150.00 FOR THE SERVICES
OF HIS ATTORNEY.
The most important point which plaintiff raises on
his appeal is the inadequate award of attorney fees since
the measure of fees granted is a tool of justice.
inadequate or excessive taxation thwarts justice.

Their
57 ALR3rd

475, 2(a).
Our code governs the award of attorney fees

in fore-

closure actions as follows1
In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's
fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount
thereof shall be fixed by the court, any stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding; provided
no other or greater amount shall be allowed or
decreed than the sum which shall appear by the
evidence to be actually charged by and to be
paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. If it
shall appear that there is an agreement or
understanding to divide such fees between the
plaintiff and his attorney, or between the
attorney and any other person except an attorney
associated with him in the cause, only the amount
to be retained by the attorney or attorneys shall
be decreed as against the defendant. 78-37-9
UCA 1953, as amended.
There is general agreement not only that fees of attorneys
should be adequate, but also that fees should be determined
on the basis of a number of factors, no one of which should
be controlling.

57 ALR3rd 475, 2(a).

Both the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the
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Utah State Bar and the corresponding Disciplinary Rule of the
code of professional conduct of the American Bar Association,
DR2-106(b) sets forth many of the criteria layed down by the
courts in the past as followsa
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of
the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the
fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to
be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the followings
( 1)

The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the
skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly.
-

( 2)

The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer.

( 3)

The fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services.

( 4)

The amount involved and the results obtained.

(5)

The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances.

( 6)

The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client.

(7)

The experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.

( 8)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

DR2-106(B), RRBC Utah State Bar; Code of Professional
Responsibility ABA.

-17-
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In 1949 our court discussed the old Canon 12 from which
the new disciplinary rule for our Bar and the ABA sterns.
In counseling the State Industrial Commission on how to
determine a reasonable fee they said in part1
While ordinarily our power does not go beyond
that of setting aside an order of the commission,
in a case such as this we think it wise to advise
the commission as to some of the factors which
enter into the determination of a reasonable fee
for legal work performed • • • • The commission
would not be arbitrary or unreasonable unless it
fixed a fee which any reasonable mind, familiar
with the value of attorneys' services would say
was less than reasonable. That of course means
that there must necessarily be a wide range because
attorneys themselves vary widely as to the reasonableness of fees for professional work. And it
must be kept in mind that here we are dealing with
compensation benefits. Much could be said regarding theanount of attorneys• fees. Lawyers perform
differently according to their ability and experience. Sonework faster and more accurately and
thoroughly than others. Each brings to his task
his own capacity, expertness, ability, dispatch
and experience. The author in a dissenting opinion in the case of Ellis v. Industrial Commission,
91 Utah 432, 64 P2d 363, dwelt at some length on
these factors.
It may be briefly said that an
incompetent lawyer is apt to be a detriment to
his client and is usually overpaid, whatever he
receives, while a competent, well-trained, and
skillful attorney may ofttimes be underpaid for
the services he renders.
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Utah State
Bar, adopted May 28, 1936, approved by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah March 1, 1937, with
amendments effective March 10, 1940, provides
as follows1
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges
which overestimate their advice and services,
as well as those which undervalue them. A client•s

-18-
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ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess
of the v~lue of the service, though his poverty
may require a less charge, or even none at all,
The reasonable requests of brother lawyers and
of their widows and orphans without ample ~eans
should receive special and kindly consideration:
"In determining the amount of the fee, it is
proper to considers (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance of
employment in the particular case will preclude
the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely
to arise out of the transaction, and in which
there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise
he would be employed, or will involve the loss of
other employment while employed in the particular
case or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the
customary charges of the Bar for similar services;
(4) the amount involved in the controversy and for
the benefits resulting to the client from the
services; (5) the contingency or the certainty
of the compensation; and (6) the character of the
employment, whether casual or for an established
and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere
guides in ascertaining the real value of the service.
"In determining the customary charges of the Bar
for similar services, it is proper for a lawyer
to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by
a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as
his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that
the profession is a branch of the administration
of justice and not a mere money-getting trade,"
It should be noted the above does not lay down a
rule but presents guides for the fixing of attorneys'
fees and so expressly states. , • •
It would be the duty of the commission by evidence
to fix a fee within the zone of reasonableness• The
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commission would not ordinarily be required to
determine from the evidence what would be the
lower and upper limits of the zone for the
services in any particular case. But it must
be satisfied from evidence adduced as to the
reasonable worth of the services rendered that
the fee i t fixes is within the zone. Thatcher
vs. Industrial Commission, 207 P2d 178 (Utah
1949).
The amount of time and labor expended by the attorney
is of major importance.

American Law Reports states

It appears to be universally agreed that the
amount of time and labor expended by the attorney
on behalf of his client is, in general, one of
the most important factors, if not the most
important factor, considered by the courts in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee
in a particular case • • • • 57 ALR3rd 475, 2(a).
But the real test is the value of the services performed
by the attorney for his client.

The Supreme Court of Kansas

has said on this points
The real test in the allowance of attorney fees
is the value of the services performed by the
attorney on behalf of his client; and the court
in determining the amount thereof may consider
labor, time and trouble involved, as well as the
extent of services rendered and the nature and
importance of the litigation; also the responsibility imposed on such counsel; the amount of
money involved; the skill and experience called
for in the performance of the services; the
professional character and the standing of the
attorney; and the results secured. Attebery vs.
MFA Mutual Insurance Com an , 191 Kan. 178, 388
P2d 647 Kan. 1963 •
Applying the value of service test in the above case,
the Kansas court rejected the contention that the amount in
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controversy should control the fee awarded and granted attorneys'
fees of $400.00 in an action to recover the value of an automobile under collision coverage where verdict for plaintiff
was only $300.00 and insurer tendered $272.50.

Attebery v.

MFA Mutual, Supra.
Our own court found $1,056.00 not excessive attorney
fees in successfully foreclosing a $6,068.00 mortgage where
the defendant set up as a defense a breach of a separate contract and a counterclaim for specific performance.
Build, Inc., 16 U2d 401, 402 P2d 699 (Utah 1965).

Wallace v.
And our

court has also felt that an attorney fee of $2,500.00 is
not unreasonable in a sununary judgment on a trust deed securing a note of $27,500.00 where the time and amount of work
was taken in evidence.

Security Title Company vs. Pay Less

Builders' Supply, 17 U2d 179, 407 P2d 141 (Utah 1965).
In addition to the foregoing criteria, Bar Association
suggested fee schedules, charges in the same locality, and current inflationary trends and cost of living are all persuasive
evidence of what constitutes a reasonable fee.

57 ALR3rd

475; 58 ALR3rd 201; 7 CJS Attorney and Client, Sec. 191(2).
Further, our Utah court as early as 1915 had this to
say about what constitutes a reasonable fees
By a 'reasonable fee,' no doubt, is meant one which
is reasonable under all the facts and circumstances

-21-
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~f

each case, What is reasonable, therefore,
in a large measure at least, must depend upon
the amount in controversyp the labor, and
responsibility imposed upon the attorney in
obtaining judgment, as these things may have
arisen from the issues presented and tried,
If an attorney is required to do no more than
to prepare the formal pleadings and decree in
a default case, a smaller sum, no doubt, would
be reasonable, than in a contested case, and
especially in one where the issues were numerous and where intricate questions of both fact
and law arose and had to be determined. Jensen vs.
Lichtenstein, 45 U 320, 145 P 1036 (Utah 1915),
enphasis added.
Then, we also feel as a tool of justice for all concerned,
the adequacy of the fees should always be considered where
allowed for to insure the aggrieved will obtain adequate
representation.

We agree with the learned justices in

the Thatcher v. Industrial Commission case, supra, when
they adviseds
While attorneys may not hope to be compensated
to the full measure of the value of their time
and work, they must not be limited to such
niggardly fees that they cannot afford to accept
compensation cases. And particularly where it
has become necessary to carry a compensation
case to this court should the commission be at
least moderately liberal in allowance of attorneys'
fees. Better that an applicant should lose 15%
to 20% of his benefits in attorneys' fees than
that he should receive no benefits at all merely
because no lawyer could afford or would be willing to accept his case and properly present it
to the commission and the courts, for the main
reason that the compensation for such services
would be grossly inadequate. Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, supra.
See also R22 for plaintiff's additional analysis.
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Justice

Wade

in his concurring opinion in Thatcher

also saids
I do not believe that the legislature intended
this kind of work to be done without compensation or for unreasonable low compensation. If
we adhere to the rule that such compensation may
be so fixed then many cases will have to be litigated without the benefit of legal counsel and
many a deserving person who is entitled to compensation. will be barred therefrom • • • and the applicant will not be fortunate enough to contact a lawyer who would take his case, knowing that he would
not be adequately compensated for his services.
The attorneys' fees should therefore be fixed within the bounds of reasonable compensation for the
services rendered anp should be sufficient in
that the average lawyer can afford to take that
kind of case without losing money by such employment. Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, supra.
Even chief Justice Pratt dissenting in Thatcher said:
It is human nature to shy away from the arbitrary
control of others, and attorneys are no exception.
Met with a law in which the layman is given such
unbridled control of his fees, the attorney where
arbitrariness is less apt to follow. Who suffers
as a result? The applicant before the commission,
as he (or she, as in this case) is handicapped in
acquiring justice. He either must accept inferior
service, or must fight his battle alone against
astute well paid counsel of--in many instances-his corporate employer. Thatcher v. Industrial
Conunission, supra.
We do not feel the trial court followed the above principles in its award of attorney fees.

See R22 and Rl4o

The applicable contractual provision of the mortgage note
(Exhibit "A" of complaint; RlOO; Al) states&

-23-
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If this note is placed with an attorney for
collection, or if suit be instituted for collection, then in either event, the undersigned
agrees to pay reasonable attorneys' fees.
(Emphasis added)
The applicable contractual provision of the mortgage
securing said note (Exhibit "B" of Complaint, RlOO; A2)
statess
The mortgagors agree to pay all taxes and assessmen7s on said.pr~mises, and a reasonable attorney's
ief: in case suit is brought to collect the debt
hereby secured, which fee is secured hereby. • •
(Emphasis added)
The last published Central Utah Bar Association minimum
fee schedule of 1969 (A3) and the Advisory Schedule of Minimum Fees of the Utah State Bar last published in March 1969
(A4) both suggest $500.00 as a minimum fee for foreclosure
of mortgages on real property.

The suggested minimum fee

for appearance in any district court for any reason is the
sum of $150.00, and minimum fee for pre-trial conferences
$100.00.

Said schedules also provide a suggested percentage

fee for default foreclosures of $50.00 of the first $100,00
recovered, one-third of the next $400.00 recovered, and 25%
of the next $500.00 recovered in no contest situations.
A recent Utah State Bar letter reported average hourly
attorney fees to be $53.00 per hour in early 1974 (AS).
The usual and ordinary minimum fee charged by attorneys in
Provo for office work and court work is $35.00 per hour (T5712·1:
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and in the Salt Lake area $47.00 to $52.00 an hour (T57a2-4).
Cost of living for attorneys as well as any other member
of society have appreciated considerably.

The inflationary

rate evidenced by the Consumer Price Index indicates 80.3 on
the index in 1956 and 156.5 for the present•

There has

been over a 10(],l(, increase in the cost of living since 1956.
Of major importance is the time expended and labor performed by counsel on behalf of plaintiff.

The following amounts

of time expended were testified to by plaintiff's counsels
4 1/8 hours negotiating prior to suit for return
of compressors by Durrant and settlement (T55al8)
3 3/8 hours preparation of Complaint, Lis Pendens,
and further negotiation with Attorney Dorius and
Hemmert regarding possible settlement (T55a28)
6 3/8 hours responding to Counterclaim, preparing Interrogatories to defendant, and attempting
to obtain answers to Interrogatories (T56a2)
3 1/4 hours preparing and appearing on Motion to
Dismiss (T5615)
6 1/2 hours further discovery after receiving
answers from Attorney Dorius pursuant to court's
order of August 22 (T56al0)
6 3/8 hours pre-trial preparation from time court
sent notice of pre-trial and including pre-trial
conference and negotiations regarding settlement
(T56113)
3 7/8 hours trial preparation (T56al7)
Totals

33 7/8 hours.

-25-
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An examination of the pleadings prepared and filed
in this action shows further the labor expended on behalf
of plaintiff by plaintiff's counsel including Complaint,
Lis Pendens, Summons, Reply to Counterclaim, Interrogatories
to Defendant, Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, Motion
for Default Judgment and Dismissal, Notice of Readiness,
and the final Findings, Conclusions, and Foreclosure Decree
and Judgment.

Since the Judgment was entered, plaintiff's

counsel has further moved the court to amend Findings and
Judgment and prepared the Statement of Points and Authorities
in support of said Motion and reply Points to defendant's
objections.
The record also reflects in defendant's Answer and
Counterclaim (R96) an affirmative defense of release of
mortgage.

The mortgage and note in this action was ambiguous

and the defense raised by defendant required plaintiff's
counsel to prepare detailed interrogatories, prod for
their answer, examine the law, and interview officers at
First Security Bank in Payson in preparation for trial.
It was only at pre-trial and after this exhaustive preparation that plaintiff was able to obtain admission from defendant to the continuing genuineness of the mortgage lien.
Further testimony establishing attorney fees (T52155-57)
establishes the expertise and qualifications of counsel, and
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the fee of $600.00 to be charged plaintiff for the foreclosure.
None of this testimony establishing a reasonable attorney fee
was contradicted by testimony presented by defendant.

Morri-

son v. Federico, 232 P2d 374, 379 (Utah 1951).
If the award of $150.00 attorney fees to plaintiff herein
is allowed to stand, in effect if you suttract the 3 1/4 hours
spent by plaintiff's counsel in preparing his original Motion
to Dismiss for failure to file proper answers to interrogatories
and disregard any time spent since trial in preparing Findings,
Conclusions, and Decree and Judgment, etc., plaintiff's counsel
has been working for $5.00 per hour for 30 hours and even if
you cut that in half, plaintiff's counsel has been working for
only $10.00 per hour for 15 hours.
Taking the figure of 30 hours billable time per week at
$150.00, an attorney would gross about $600.00 per month since
there is a recognizable amount of nonbillable time each week
for indigents, etc.

That would not even pay his office rental

and secretarial expenses.
to society.

An attorney has a responsibility

But an attorney must also sustain himself.

Even if the amount of time testified to by plaintiff's
counsel is divided in half, taking $150.00 for 15 hours of
work, an attorney would gross approximately $1,200.00 per month.
Today subtracting all overhead expenses, he would end UP with
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an income of approximately $200.00 a month.

Reasonable?

If the rule is established that a defendant who brings
a counter complaint and proves a right to recover under
said counter complaint, no matter how small, is allowed
to interfere with the amount of fees awarded plaintiff
on his complaint, inj~tice will resulto
regarding this point on pages 3 & 4

The argument

of plaintiff's State-

ment of Points and Authorities (Rl4) is pertinent.
The mortgage note (Exhibit "A" of Complaint, RlOO; Al)
provides for attorney fees both before and after suit.

There-

fore, the fees awarded plaintiff should encompass services
rendered by his counsel in collecting the note and foreclosing the mortgage prior to commencement of suit as well as
after.

The Florida District Court of Appeal recently held

that where an attorney for the prevailing party spent 44
hours on a case, $500.00 attorney fees awarded was an abuse
of discretion and the award was increased to $1,500.00.
Flagala Corporation vs. Hamm, 302 So2d 195 (Fla. 1974).
Plaintiff also feels the trial court abused its discretion
and plaintiff should be awarded increased attorney feeso
Plaintiff further requests the court to award him a
reasonable attorney fee for bringing this appeal.

Our court

has held that said attorney fees on appeal are discretionary.
State vs. Shonka, 3 U2d 121, 279 P2d 709 (Utah 1955).
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In neighboring jurisdictions of Arizona and California they deemed
them allowable on appeal.

Amos Flight Operations, Inc. vs.

Thunderbird Bank, 540 P2d 1244 (Arizona 1975); San Luis Obispo
Bay Properties, Inc. vs. Pacific Gas and Electric Company. 104
cal.Rptr. 733, 28 Cal App. 3rd 556 (Cal. 1972).

Plaintiff

therefore respectfully requests an appropriate fee award on
this appeal, and a more respectable fee for the foreclosure
action from the time counsel was first retained through entry
of findings and decree.
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CONCLUSION
The Warranty Deed delivered to defendant by plaintiff
merged the earnest money receipt and defendant should not
recover damages from plaintiff except upon theories of
negligence, unlawful conversion, or some other tort.

More-

over, there is not sufficient evidence as a reasonable basis
for the award of damages and even if there was, equity cannot
allow defendant to recover twice or for plaintiff to pay
twice after he obtained the compressors which were taken
by Mr. Durrant, attempted to return them to the store in
Santaquin, had them rejected by defendant and later returned
them to the store to the new owner.
Attorney fees are a tool of justice.

The court should

have awarded more adequate fees to plaintiff for his attorneys.
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS that the $200.00 damages
plus interest awarded defendant be stricken and that he be
awarded additional and more adequate attorney fees together
with attorney fees for this appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,
McCUNE & McCUNE
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellant
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MONTHLY INSTALLMENT

MORTGAGE NOTE
$ 4, jOO. 00

-·- --- -··- ·-·----

. ..::.._•

.................................... R~.~9.~····-·········· Utah

-. - - . -

. - --- - - -

. - -~

-

Feb~

20 · 19 71:;. ~ ·

~~~:·1~:~-.:~~::={~·~~

FOR vAL UE RECEIVED, the undersigned severally _pi:_:cim~ to pay_to FIRST SECURITY i3ANI{°'.:~~- _
OF UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, or_ order, the pnncipal_~~~f~,~-:_:~~;--~:::=__.:S~~;.'.:
__1:_()rtT.'1.'£l!t'._e__ ~~~~-~--~~ .. 9.i?.l_~~ ...:.. _: ..:.:.. L.: ... ~.... ~....:_..:.::~-'.::::_ ..DQLLARS. ($~1..2~:00~.::j:.".~.:._
with interest from .....::.... - ... F~lm.\~ ...?.Q................., 19.TI... , at the rate of.....§.,_l.::::.::...perccntperann;un'.'~
on the unpaid principal balanffi.g:ii}l. 'W]..~· ,+'h~t'1~t.c< is .J!al[able in ls,wful~money of the United.::=--·States of America to the/fl~~ SEtlJlt~~R: 5ritJ-fXH;~'ffb1NAL ASSOCIATION-iit ib-~~
__ .feyJ?_QfL. ...-.. :........ -··--···- Branch in ... -····:·--···--.:.....I'.e;Y.Jil.OD.=..::::.=::::::.:~_:., Utah,· or ~t -s~ch:;~:other place as the legal holder hereof may designate in writing, deliver~ }>r:. mailed to the debtOr-:hr ;::;: .

~~~-~~:r;~~- -~~~~:i;~:~~~:~~~:00Jiw=:~:::;.:=~::;:~~:::;.:~:.::·~:::=~~~:::~-~~~;.<~::~~t.f~=1~~-···---·-··-··-··-··--~_g}'L ..........:........,
theJClmt
1

•ach commencing on the

day

~f each

-:-~

~,..:::

·-.

·-·

-.
~ >.,~:~.:.~''""~~~:

ay of

month thereafter until .paid._ ...... ::·:: ..... ~ ...... - ......... ..

Delinquent installments, including interest,
from the date of delinquency until paid.

~2~

19.1.l.., and continuing on

shall bear interest-~t-~~ r~t~ ofeig~t--~ c~t p~;~~~:::~:~·

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued
the principal.

·

. - ..:..~:' '~

·· · · -

interest,-~~d-~-:~~cc:if-any, shall be appli~:~~-~:/_- __ :;:-=~~~~:::

:. -

>

_:_ ·_

:~~~-;::
~

In case of default in payment of any of said installments of principal--~d interest;,;. any part ther~ · ··
of, it shall be optional with the legal holder of this note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and ·
payable, and proceedings may at once be instituted for the enforcement and collection of the same by law.
lf thjs gate js placed with an attorney for collection, or if suit be instituted for collection, then in either
event, the unoersigned agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof sev~rally waive presentment for payment, pro·
test, notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and consent that this note and any payment due
or to become clue hereunder may be extended or renewed without previous d~1111d or notice.
This note is to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
This note is given for an actual loan of the above amount and is secured by ·a real -estate mortgage.
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-~----~~----------APPENDIX 2
All of which sums the mortgagors agree to repay, on demand when not otherwis
d
shall well and truly pay each and all of the sums of indebtedness herein s ecified i~ "}ree ' and l!. the said me
then .these presents and everything herein contained shall be void anythi~g here'm co~~~f~:~c~0 ":_t,th the te11r;
standing; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.
'
e contrary:'
The lien of this mortgage shall remain in full force and effect during any postponement or e t
·
ant by the mortgagors to be perfonned or of the time of payment of the indebtedness or any pa t txh ensi on of •r:
r
ereo 1 secure~
. The mortgagors shall not commit or pennit waste; shall make no structural alterations in said m t
·
without the pnor. wntten consent of the mortgagee; shall obey and observe all laws, ordinances, gov~~;aged.;
t1ons, and. restrictive cov~nants pertaining to the use and occupancy of said mortgaged property· and shalfenk
property in as good condition as at present, reasonable wear and tear excepted, and upon any 'failure so matt.
mortgagee, at its option, may cause reasonable maintenance work to be performed at the cost of the mortg~og~
all taxe a
·
ep s t premises ree r
responsible fire insurance t·
satisfactory to said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, for the sum of $ ···-----·····----------- until said debt is luiln
insurance policy to be de!Jvered to and to be made payable to said mortga1:ee, its successors or assigns whc:
powered to collect the same and apply the proceeds on said note. If said mortgagors fail to maintain such ins··\
to pay such taxes and assessments when due, or to keep off mechanic's liens, then said mortgagee, its succeSS::·
signs may at its oph_on, declare said note and mortgage immediately due and payable, and proceed by law toi
this mortgage, or said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, may, if it so elects, pay said taxes, assessments'
costs of insurance; and the. amount so J?ald, together with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per,,,;.:
be secured hereby, and notice of mtent1on to exercise such option or election is hereby waived.
'
If said property is leff vacant, said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, is authorized to occupy the same
the insurance valid and prevent damage to the property.
The recording and satisfaction of this mortgage shall be at the cost of said mortgagors.
If the mortgagors, or either of them shall be adjudged bankrupt or make assignment of his, her or their.
or any part thereof, for the benefit of creditors, or if any portion of the mortgaged premises shall be att:
levied upon in any suit against the mortgagors or either of them, then in either of such events the holder h"
declare the whole indebtedness due and payable and immediately foreclose this mortgage.
If the mortgagors default in any of the payments or covenants contained in this mortgage to be performedt
or if any warranty made by them be broken, then, without notice to the mortgagors, the whole sum secur<i'
shall at the option of the holder hereof, immediately become due and rayable. This mortgage shall cover and inc
crops, rents, issues and profits from the said mortgaged premises from and after such default, both before andr
commencement of foreclosure proceedings. In case of foreclosure the court, upon filing of the complaint, on 1e
the plaintiff and without notice to the mortgagors, or either of them, and without regard to the solvency or bm
of the mortgagors or either of them, and regardless of the nnture of the property or the value thereof or Iii!
which the same may be applied, shall appoint a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and•crops, rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the debt secured hereby, or hold~
pursuant to the order of the court; and the holder, upon entry oi judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the~;
of the mortgaged premises during the period of redemption, &nd th~ judgment shall provide for such possess10no
issuance of the necessary process of court to carry out such provision of the judgment. Each and all of the remed!
to the mortgagee by this mortgage shall be deemed additional and cumulative, and not exclusive. If any provilio:
mortgage shall be held void, the same shall not affect any other provision hereof.
Whenever used, the singular number shall include the plural, the plural the singular, the use of any geol
be applicable to all genders, and the term "mortgagee" shall include any payee of the indebtedness hereby securr.
transferee thereof whether by operation of law or otherwise.
The said mortgagors covenant and agree to pay any and all taxes and assessm.en.ts that may be levied~·
mortgage or the debt hereby secured by reason of any State or Federal Law now existing or which may herti
enacted.
WITNESS, the hands of said mortgagors this
at ··-----··--···--·--·-··-··-·----·-·-·-··-- ___ l'ayson.
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

--------------------------

INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

··--·-·---·--·A.O., 19 .. 71, ___ , personally appeared v"
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Contracts, sale or purdi:'"-' "[real or personal property or
both --------------------------------------------------------------$ 25.00
Conditional Sales of Personal Property ___________ :::·-----------------------$ 15.00~
Power of Attorney -------------------------------------------------------------------------$ 12.5(
\
Bulle ?ales Transfers, including affidavit, cont~~~t--~f---~i~;
'
assignment of lease and other necessary documents
$ 125.00
Certi~icate Doing ~~sin~s under Assumed Name.......
10.00
Drawmg of Mecharuc s Lien (if description is furnished)
$ 25.00
Income Tax Returns, State and Federal, Farmers and B~~~~Men -------------------------------------------------------------------------$ 15.00
Income Tax Returns, State and Federal, wages only::::::::::::::::$ 10.00
Esc~ow Agree!ilents, including deed, etc .....................................$
25.00
Notices to Qwt ···············------------------······----------------·························$ 15.00
VII. CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES

:::::::::::::$

Foreclosure by non-judicial process, including all other sales
not under judicial process.......................................................$ 100.00

VIII. COLLECTIONS AND FORECLOSURES
Notes and Contracts Providing for the Payment of Reasonable
Attorneys Fees Where There Is No Mortgage or Lien
Security:
(a) Unsecured
Amount of fee
Amount of principal
Per cent on portion
and interest
for fee of recovery
in judgment
Mortgage

Total
judgment
without fees

The first __________ $ 100
$ 100
50%
$ 50.00
133.33
500
331,3%
400
The next -------1,000
125.00
500,
25%
The next -------The next ________ 1,000
2,000
200.00
20%
10,000
1,200.00
15%
The next -------- 8,000
10%
All over ---------- 10,000
Notes, Mortgages and Contracts that A:re Supported By a
Mortgage or Lien.
(b) Secured
The first ________ $ 100
$ 100
$ 50.00
50%
500
133.33
400
33'f.i%
The next -------1,000
125.00
500
The next -------25~
2,000
150.00
15 0
The next -------- 1,000
20,000
1,800.00
10%
The next -------- 18,000
Above ______________ 20,000 no set fee

Total fees

$

50.00
1&3.33
308.33
508.33
1,708.33

C·
50.00
183.33
308.33
458.00

$

2,258.~3

NOTE: It is recognized that a fee in foreclosures of Mortgages may be on a ~on
contingent or guaranteed fee basis. and the usual factors of amount and-~
involved. and complexities, retainers, etc., may be considered in detenDllllDg
a reasonable fee.

Minmium Fee for Foreclosure of Mortgage on Real Property....$ 500.00
( c) Trust Deeds

Foreclosure of Trust Deed by Exercise of Power of Sale as Provided
for Under Trust Deed Act Enacted by 1961 Legislature.
1. Full fee, if foreclosure proceeds to Trustee's Sale and Deed.
Amount of
Unpaid Principal
Advances and
Accrued Interest

The first __ ________ $
The next
The next __
The next
All over

Percent for Fee

1,000

673%

7,000
42,000
50,000
100,000

2%
l'f.!%
73of1%
1h of 1%

Amount of
Fee on Such
Percentage

$ 66.66
( Min.-$66.66)
140.00
560.00
333.32

Total Fees

$

66.66
206.66
766.66
1,099.9P
'--..-/
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APPENDIX 4
.' ·:·E :>ISTR!C':' (';; l; ltTS
CIVIL A:\'D CRIMINAL Dl\'ISIONS

a. Appearance for either party __________ _
---------------- -----------·--------$150.00
b. Motions ------------------------------------------------------------- ______________________ _
75.00
c. Per diem for conducting trial ---------------·-------------------------------------------- 200.00
d. Pretrial Conferences ------------------------------ __________ -------------------------------- 100.00
e. Minimum Retainer (to be credited against total fee) ---------------------- 250.00
The following schedule of attorneys' fees has been adopted by the
Third Judicial District Court as of December 1, 1959, in default cases
presented without proof as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees in
actions for the collection of money:
(Notes and Contracts Providing for the Payment of Reasonable Attorneys
Fees Where There Is No Mortgage or Lien Security)
(a) unsecured
Amount of
principal

,., cent

and lntere1I

for fee

Amounr
of fee
on portion,

on lvdgment

The first
The next
The next
The next
The next
All over

$

100.
400.
500.
1,000.
8,000.
10,000.

$

50.00
133.00
125.00
200.00
1,200.00

Total

,_

without

of recovery

50%
331h%
25%
20%
15%
10%

,...

Total

ludgmenl

$

100.
500.
1,000.
2,000.
10,000.

$

50.00
183.33
308.33
508.33
1,708.33

(Notes, Mortgages and Contracts That Are Supported
By a Mortgage or Lien.)
(b) secured

The first
The next
The next
The next
The next
Above

$

100.
400.
500.
1,000.
18,000.
20,000.

50%
$ 50.00
133.00
331h%
125.00
25%
150.00
15%
1,800.00
10%
no fee is set

$

100.
500.
1,000.
2 000.
20,000.

$

50.00
183.33
308.33
458.00
2,258.33

NOTE: It is recognized that a fee in foreclosures of Mortgages may ~e on a ooocontingent on guaranteed fee basis, and the usual fa~t<?rs of amount and time Involved,
and complexities, etc., may be considered In determining a reasonable fee.
Minimum Fee for Foreclosure of Mortgage on Real Property .................................... $500.00

f. Quieting Title ----------------------------------------------------··-·------·-------------·: .......... $250.00
g. Terminate Life Estate
With Court Action ------------------------------·----------------------------------------- 100.00
75.00
Without Court Action ----------------------------------------··----9
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IAWYERS I FEES CN UPSWING

The typical hourly rates charged by selected law firms in most parts of the United
States and in Canada rose sharply between
early 1973 and early 1974.
The 1974 Survey of Law Firm Economics,
conducted by the consulting organization
of Altman & Weil, Inc., shows that median
hourly rates went up in all regions except
the Midwestern States. The hourly charge
rates reported by 181 law firms for lawyers with six to ten years of experience
were:
Early
Early
1973
Area
.J.974
Canada
\iil~~tlluiig

1'.1

ni

Midwestern U.S.
southwestern U.S.
Northeastern U.S.
Southern U.S.

"Grandpa, tell me again about the good old days before 'No-Fault'."

Reprinted with permission from Erie
County (New York) Bar Association
Bulletin.

U.S. SUPREME COURT AUTOMATING
The Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of
the United States, is at present experimenting
with automation. Much of the material in the
office will be reduced .to machine-readable
form and as part of the project all accredited attorneys will be listed on machine-readable tape. All attorneys who are members of
the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United
States are asked therefore to fill out the
following form and return it to the Clerk,
Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, and mark it for the attention of BAR PROJ.
NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ DATE ADMITTED _ _ _ __
BUSINESS ADDRESS:

----------------

Street. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City & State

-------------~~---

ip

RESIDENCE ADDRESS:
City ~ State

Street _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

$45
j~

45
40

so

45

The average fee charged by these firms for
formation of a busine~s corporation with
$100,000 capital ranges from a low $419
in the Southwestern United States to a
high of $530 average in the Western States.
Canadian firms charge an average of $480.
The range of reported charges for this
service is from under $250 to more than
$1,000.
Average per diem rates for Federal Distric~j:
Court were reported in 1973 and 1974 as
:I
follows:
Early
Early
:l
1973
1974
11
Area
western U.S.
Midwestern U.S.
Southwestern U.S.
Northeastern U.S.
Sou-chern U. S.

$374
352
364
355
362

$378
368
369
381
376

The survey provides similar information
for a number of other specific legal services, including legal matters in real
estate, estate planning, pensions, professional corporations and SEC practice.
The 1974 survey of Law Firm Ecomonics is
an annual service of Altman & Weil, Ina.,
a management consulting firm which specializes in the problems of lawyers.

-------------~~--lp
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$55
~~
45
46
52
53
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Mailed 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to Mr. Dale M. Dorius, Attorney at Law, P.Brigham City, Utah

84032, on this

_\JQ_.....
u__~/y'f\........_R>JA
........._______ , 1976.
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Box 165,

day of
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